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A VISCOSITY APPROACH TO STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
OF CONTROL AND STOPPING INVOLVING IMPULSIVE CONTROL
DAVID MGUNI∗
Abstract.
This paper analyses a stochastic differential game of control and stopping in which one of the players
modifies a diffusion process using impulse controls, an adversary then chooses a stopping time to end
the game. The paper firstly establishes the regularity and boundedness of the upper and lower value
functions from which an appropriate variant of the dynamic programming principle (DPP) is derived.
It is then proven that the upper and lower value functions coincide so that the game admits a value
and that the value of the game is a unique viscosity solution to a HJBI equation described by a double
obstacle quasi-integro-variational inequality.
Key words. Impulse control, Stochastic Differential Games, Optimal Stopping, Diffusion process,
Dynkin Games, Viscosity solution
1. Introduction. This paper considers a stochastic differential game in which a
controller modifies a diffusion process and an adversary stops the game. The objective of
the controller is to exercise an impulse control that minimises an objective criterion whilst
the adversary seeks to stop the process at a time which maximises the same function. A
motivation for this investigation is a formal mathematical treatment of the probability of
lifetime ruin problem which also includes financial transaction costs a problem in which
an investor seeks to maximise their lifetime wealth by modifying their investment position
whilst minimising the risk that their wealth process falls below some prefixed value.
Problems that combine discretionary stopping and stochastic optimal control have
attracted much attention over recent years; in particular there is a significant amount of
literature on models of this kind in which a single controller uses continuous controls to
modify the system dynamics (see for example [4, 2, 5]). Game-theoretic formulations of
the problem in which the task of controlling the system dynamics and exit time is divided
between two players who act according to separated interests have also been studied [1].
Impulse control problems are stochastic control models in which the cost of control
is bounded below by some fixed positive constant which prohibits continuous control,
therefore augmenting the problem to one of finding both an optimal sequence of times
to apply the control policy, in addition to determining optimal control magnitudes. We
refer the reader to [6] as a general reference to impulse control theory and to [26, 21] for
articles on applications. Impulse control frameworks therefore underpin the description
of financial environments with transaction costs and liquidity risks and more generally,
applications of optimal control theory in which the system dynamics are modified by a
sequence of discrete actions - see [19] for an extensive survey of applications of impulse
control models within finance.
Stochastic differential games with impulse control have also recently appeared in the
impulse control literature. In [28] stochastic differential games in which one player uses
impulse control and the other uses continuous controls were studied. Using a verification
argument, the conditions under which the value of game is a solution to a HJBI equation
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is also shown in [28]. In [10], Cosso was the first to study a stochastic differential game
in which both players use impulse control using viscosity theory. Thus, in [10] it is shown
that the game admits a value which is a unique viscosity solution to a double obstacle
quasi-variational inequality.
Despite the small but notable literature on impulse controls involving two players,
the task of analysing stochastic differential games with a discretionary stopper and a
controller who uses impulse controls remains unaddressed.
Stochastic differential games of continuous control and stopping have a number of
applications within theoretical finance. A notable example is the investor lifetime ruin
problem in which an investor, who operates in a Black-Scholes market seeks to maximise
some utility criterion which is a function of his wealth process whilst seeking some optimal
time to exit the market which minimises the risk of ruin (see for example [2] and [5]).
The restriction to continuous controls prohibits the inclusion of transaction costs for
which the investor must take actions in a timed and discretised fashion therefore necessi-
tating that the class of controls used to modify the system dynamics are impulse controls.
The current paper therefore establishes the necessary results to construct optimal in-
vestment policies for the lifetime ruin problem with minimally bounded or transaction
costs.
In control theory and more generally, differential game theory there are two main
approaches to obtaining a solution to the problem. The first approach is a verification
method which involves characterising the value function in terms of a set of (in general,
non-linear, second order) PDEs or HJB equations (in the case of differential games, HJBI
equations). The verification approach is a direct method that is initialised at the dynamic
programming principle from which a classical limit procedure is used to then derive the
HJB equations.
Though the verification approach offers a direct means of establishing a PDE charac-
terisation of the value function, verification theorems impose strong smoothness conditions
on the value function that do not hold in a number of optimal control settings. Indeed,
verification theorems require that the value function must be everywhere differentiable and
have smooth derivatives almost everywhere.1 In problems in which the controller makes
discrete modifications to a diffusion process such smoothness assumptions are likely to be
violated. In such cases, it is not possible to invoke the mean value theorem to derive the
HJB(I) equations via a classical limiting procedure. A second issue is that verification
theorems do not address the question of existence of the value of stochastic differential
games nor is the question of uniqueness considered: in general, there exist an infinite
number of Lipschitz continuous functions that satisfy the HJB(I) equations of verification
theorems (see for example exercise 3.2 in [8]).
Fortunately, using viscosity theory it can be shown that the value functions of a wide
class of stochastic control problems (and consequently stochastic differential games) do
in fact satisfy verification theorems when the HJBI equations are interpreted in a weaker,
viscosity sense. Indeed, viscosity solutions generalise the notion of a solution to a PDE to
a non-classical definition2. The main advantage of the viscosity solution approach is that
1The assumption that the value function is differentiable everywhere is sometimes referred to as the
high contact or smooth fit principle.
2Viscosity solutions were introduced by Michael Crandall and Pierre-Louis Lions in 1983 [12] and was
developed to handle first order HJB equations. The theory was subsequently developed to handle second
order equations in part due to a comparison principle result introduced by Robert Jensen in 1988 [18].
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it does not require that the (everywhere) smoothness of the value function be established.
2. Contribution. This paper analyses a stochastic differential game of control and
stopping in which the controller uses impulse controls; the results cover a general setting
in which the underlying state process is a diffusion process. We examine the problem
using viscosity theory from which we show that the value of the game exists and is a
unique viscosity solution to a HJBI equation. A similar game to the one considered in
this paper is that contained within [10]. However, unlike in our setting in one of the
players can choose to terminate the game, the analysis in [10] considers a stochastic
differential game in which both players modify the state process using impulse controls
and thus incorporates a symmetry in the class of controls used by the players. Other
related papers to the current are [1, 4, 3] in which conditions for a HJBI equation are
proved for stochastic differential games of control and stopping in which the controller
however uses continuous controls in the absence of fixed minimal costs.
The Dynamics: Canonical Description.
We suppose that the uncontrolled passive state evolves according to a stochastic process
X : [0, T ]×Ω→ S ⊂ Rp, (p ∈ N), which is a diffusion on (C([0, T ];Rp), (F(0,s)s∈[0,T ] ,F ,P0)
that is, the state process obeys the following SDE:
dXt0,x0s = µ(s,X
t0,x0
s )ds+ σ(s,X
t0,x0
s )dBs, X
t0,x0
t0 := x0, P− a.s.
∀s ∈ [0, T ], ∀(t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]× S;(2.1)
where Bs is anm−dimensional standard Brownian motion which supported by the filtered
probability space and F is the filtration of the probability space (Ω,P,F = {Fs}s∈[0,T ]).
We assume that the functions µ : [0, T ] × S → S and σ : [0, T ] × S → Rp×m are
deterministic, measurable functions that are Lipschitz continuous and satisfy a (polyno-
mial) growth condition so as to ensure the existence of (2.1) [17] (see assumptions A.1.1.
& A.2.).
We note that the above specification of the filtration ensures stochastic integration
and hence, the controlled diffusion is well defined (this is proven in [24]).
The generator of X (the uncontrolled process) acting on some function
φ ∈ C1,2(Rl,Rp) is given by:
(2.2) Lφ(·, x) =
p∑
i=1
µi(x)
∂φ
∂xi
(·, x) +
1
2
p∑
i,j=1
(σσT )ij(x)
∂2φ
∂xi∂xj
(·, x).
In this game there are two players, player I and player II. Throughout the horizon of
the game, each player incurs a cost which is a function of the value of the state process.
Let the set T be a given family of F−measurable stopping times; at any point in the
game ρ ∈ T , player II can choose to terminate the game at which point the state process
is stopped and both players receive a terminal cost (reward). Player I influences the
state process using impulse controls u ∈ U where u(s) =
∑
j≥1 ξj · 1{τj≤T}(s) for all
0 ≤ t0 < s ≤ T where ξ1, ξ2, . . . ∈ Z ⊂ S are impulses that are executed at F -measurable
stopping times {τi}i∈N where 0 ≤ t0 ≤ τ1 < τ2 < · · · < and where the set U is a convex
cone that defines the set of player I controls. We assume that the impulses ξj ∈ Z are
F−measurable for all j ∈ N. Hence, if an impulse ζ ∈ Z determined by some (admissible)
policy u ∈ U is applied at some F−measurable stopping time τ : Ω → [0, T ] when the
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state is x′ = Xt0,x0,·(τ−), then the state immediately jumps from x′ = Xt0,x0,·(τ−) to
Xt0,x0,u(τ) = Γ(x′, ζ) where Γ : S ×Z → S is called the impulse response function.
Hence, the control u = u(s, ω) ∈ U ; s ∈ [0, T ], ω ∈ Ω exercised by player I is a
stochastic process that modifies the state process directly.
For notational convenience, we use u = [τj , ξj ]j≥1 to denote the player I control policy
u =
∑
j≥1 ξj · 1{τj≤T}(s) ∈ U .
The evolution of the state process with actions is given by the following:
Xt0,x0,ur = x0 +
∫ r∧ρ
t0
µ(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds+
∫ r∧ρ
t0
σ(s,Xt0,x0,us )dBs +
∑
j≥1
ξj · 1{τj≤r∧ρ}(r)
∀r ∈ [0, T ]; ∀(t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]× S, P− a.s.(2.3)
Without loss of generality we assume that Xt0,x0,·s = x0 for any s ≤ t0.
Player I has a cost function which is also the player II gain (or profit) function. The
corresponding payoff function is given by the following expression which player I (resp.,
player II) minimises (resp., maximises):
J [t0, x0;u, ρ] = E
[ ∫ τs∧ρ
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds+
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm) · 1{τm≤τS∧ρ}
+G(τS ∧ ρ,X
t0,x0,u
τS∧ρ )1{τS∧ρ<∞}
]
,
∀(t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]× S,
(2.4)
where τS : Ω → [0, T ] is some random exit time, i.e. τS(ω) := inf{s ∈ [0, T ]|X
t0,x0,·
s ∈
S\A; ω ∈ Ω} where A is some measurable subset of S, at which point τS the game is
terminated. The functions f : [0, T ] × S → R, G : [0, T ] × S → R are the running cost
function and the bequest function respectively and the function c : [0, T ]×Z → R is the
intervention cost function.
We assume that the function G satisfies the condition lim
s→∞
G(s, x) = 0 for any x ∈ S.
Functions of the form G(s, x) ≡ e−δsG¯(x) for some δ > 0 with G¯ : |G¯(x)| < ∞ satisfy
this condition among others.
The results contained in this paper are built exclusively under the following set of
assumptions unless otherwise stated:
Standing Assumptions.
A.1.1. Lipschitz Continuity
We assume there exist real-valued constants cµ, cσ > 0 s.th. ∀s ∈ [0, T ], ∀x, y ∈ S we
have:
|µ(s, x)− µ(s, y)| ≤ cµ|x− y|
|σ(s, x) − σ(s, y)| ≤ cσ|x− y|.
A.1.2. Lipschitz Continuity
We also assume the Lipschitzianity of the functions f,G and φ and the so that we
assume the existence of real-valued constants cf , cG > 0 s.th. ∀s ∈ [0, T ], ∀(x, y) ∈ S we
have for R ∈ {f,G}:
|R(s, x) +R(s, y)| ≤ cR|x− y|.
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A.2. Growth Conditions
We assume the existence of a real-valued constants dµ, dσ > 0 s.th. ∀(s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×S
we have:
|µ(s, x)| ≤ dµ(|1 + |x|
ρ|)
|σ(s, x)| ≤ dσ(|1 + |x|
ρ|).
We also make the following assumptions on the cost function c : [0, T ]× S → R:
A.3.
Let τ, τ ′ ∈ T be F−measurable stopping times s.th. 0 ≤ τ < τ ′ ≤ T and let ξ, ξ′ ∈ Z
be measurable impulse interventions. Then we assume that the following statements hold:
c(τ, ξ + ξ′) ≤ c(τ, ξ) + c(τ, ξ′),(2.5)
c(τ, ξ) ≥ c(τ ′, ξ).(2.6)
A.4.
We also assume that there exists a constant λc > 0 s.th. infξ∈Z c(s, ξ) ≥ λc∀s ∈ [0, T ]
where ξ ∈ Z is a measurable impulse intervention.
Assumptions A.1.1. and A.2. ensure the existence and uniqueness of a solution to
(2.1) (c.f. [17]). Assumption A.1.2. is required to prove the regularity of the value function
(see for example [10] and for the single-player case, see for example [13]). Assumption
A.3. (i) (subadditivity) is required in the proof of the uniqueness of the value function.
Assumption A.3. (ii) (the player cost function is a decreasing function in time) may be
interpreted as a discounting effect on the cost of interventions. Assumption A.3. (ii)
was introduced (for the two-player case) in [27] though is common in the treatment of
single-player case problems (e.g. [13, 9]). Assumption A.4. is integral to the definition of
the impulse control problem.
Throughout the script we adopt the following standard notation (e.g. [8, 9, 24]):
Notation. Let Ω be a bounded open set on Rp+1. Then we denote by: Ω¯ - The
closure of the set Ω.
Q(s, x;R) = (s′, x′) ∈ Rp+1 : max |s′ − s|
1
2 , |x′ − x| < R, s′ < s.
∂Ω - The parabolic boundary Ω i.e. the set of points (s, x) ∈ S¯ s.th. R > 0, Q(s, x;R) 6⊂ Ω¯.
C{1,2}([0, T ],Ω) = {h ∈ C{1,2}(Ω) : ∂sh, ∂xi,xjh ∈ C(Ω)}, where ∂s and ∂xi,xj denote the
temporal differential operator and second spatial differential operator respectively.
∇φ = ( ∂φ∂x1 , . . . ,
∂φ
∂xp
) - The gradient operator acting on some function φ ∈ C1([0, T ]×Rp).
| · | - The Euclidean norm to which 〈x, y〉 is the associated scalar product acting between
two vectors belonging to some finite dimensional space.
3. Statement of Main Results. In this paper, we prove two main results for the
game that characterise the conditions for a HJBI equation in both zero-sum and non-
zero-sum impulse controller-stopper stochastic differential games.
We prove that the stochastic differential game in which one of the players uses impulse
controls and the other player chooses when to end the game admits a value.
We prove that the value of the game satisfies a double obstacle quasi-integro-
variational equality and is a unique viscosity solution to a HJBI equation.
In particular, in section V we show that equality (4.1) holds by firstly showing that
V +(resp.; V −) is a viscosity supersolution (resp.; subsolution) to the following non-linear
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obstacle problem:
{max{min[−
∂V
∂s
− LV − f, V −G], V −MV } = 0
V (Xt,x,u(τs ∧ ρ)) = G(X
t,x,u(τs ∧ ρ)).(3.1)
where L is the local stochastic generator operator associated to the process andM is the
non-local intervention operator.
To our knowledge, this is the first game that involves impulse controls in which the
role of one of the players is to stop the game at a desirable point.
Organisation. In section III, we provide some of the technical definitions in order
to provide a description of the game. Here, we also introduce the underlying concepts
required to study the game. In section IV, we prove some preliminary results that under-
pin the main analysis which is performed in section V — in particular, we prove that the
upper and lower value functions are regular and bounded. Where it is of no detriment to
the main body of ideas, we postpone some of the technical proofs of the section to the
appendix. In section V, we introduce the viscosity theory framework — here we show by
way of a dynamic programming principle and comparison principle, that the value of the
game is a unique viscosity solution to a HJBI equation. Lastly, the paper is finalised by
an appendix to which some of the technical proofs from sections IV - V are deferred.
Definitions. We now give some definitions which we shall need to describe the
system dynamics modified by impulse controls:
Definition 3.1. Denote by T(t,τ ′) the set of all F−measurable stopping times in the
interval [t, τ ′], where τ ′ is some stopping time s.th. τ ′ ≤ T . If τ ′ = T then we denote by
T ≡ T(0,T ). Let u = [τj , ξj ]j∈N be a control policy where {τj}j∈N and {ξj}j∈N are Fτj−
measurable stopping times and interventions respectively, then we denote by µ[t,τ ](u) the
number of impulses the controller (player I) executes within the interval [t, τ ] under the
control policy u ∈ U for some τ ∈ T .
Definition 3.2. Let u ∈ U be a player I impulse control. We say that an impulse
control is admissible on [0, T ] if either the number of impulse interventions is finite on
average that is to say we have that:
(3.2) E[µ[0,T ](u)] <∞
or if µ[0,T ](u) =∞ =⇒ limj→∞ τj =∞.
We shall hereon use the symbol U to denote the set of admissible player I controls. For
controls u ∈ U and u′ ∈ U , we interpret the notion u ≡ u′ on [0, T ] iff P(u = u′ a.e. on
[0, T ]) = 1.
Definition 3.3. Let u(s) =
∑
j≥1 ξj · 1{τj≤T}(s) ∈ U be a player I impulse control
defined over [0, T ], further suppose that τ : Ω → [0, T ] and τ ′ : Ω → [0, T ] are two
F−measurable stopping times with τ ≥ s > τ ′, then we define the restriction u[τ ′,τ ] ∈ U
of the impulse control u(s) to be u(s) =
∑
j≥1 ξµ]t0,τ)(u)+j · 1{τµ]t0,τ)(u)+j≥s≥τ
′}(s).
Strategies. A player strategy is a map from the other player’s set of controls to the
player’s own set of controls. An important feature of the players’ strategies is that they
are non-anticipative — neither player may guess in advance, the future behaviour of other
players given their current information.
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We formalise this condition by constructing non-anticipative strategies which were
used in the viscosity solution approach to differential games in [15]. Non-anticipative
strategies were introduced by [23, 14, 25]. Hence, in this game, one of the players chooses
his control and the other player responds by selecting a control according to some strategy.
Definition 3.4. A non-anticipative strategy on [0, T ] for player I is a measurable
map which we shall denote by α s.th. α : T → U and for any stopping time τ : Ω→ [0, T ]
and any v1, v2 ∈ T with v1 ≡ v2 on [t, τ ] we have that α(v1) ≡ α(v2) on [t, τ ].
We define the player II non-anticipative strategy β : U → T analogously. Hence, α
and β are Elliott-Kalton strategies.
Following the notation in [30], we denote the set of all non-anticipative strategies over
the time horizon [0, T ] for player I (resp., player II) by A(0,T ) (resp., B(0,T )).
Remark 3.5. The intuition behind Definition 3.4 is as follows: suppose player I em-
ploys u1 ∈ U and the system follows a path ω and that player II employs the strategy
β ∈ B(0,T ) against the control u1. If in fact player II cannot distinguish between the
control u1 and some other player I control u2 ∈ U then controls u1 and u2 induce the
same response from the player II strategy that is to say β(u1) ≡ β(u2).
The notion of non-anticipative strategies is derived from the fact that the strategies
defined in Definition 3.4 exclude the possibility of a player exploiting future information
of their opponent’s control modifications.
Note that when U is a singleton the game is degenerate and collapses into a classical
optimal stopping problem for player II with a value function and solution as that in ch.3
in [20]. Similarly, when T is a singleton the game collapses into a classical impulse control
problem for player I with a value function and solution as that in ch.6 in [20].
The following definition is a key object in the analysis of impulse control models:
Definition 3.6. Let τ ∈ T , we define the [non-local] intervention operator M : H →
H acting at a state X(τ) by the following expression:
(3.3) Mφ(τ,X(τ)) := inf
z∈Z
[φ(τ,Γ(X(τ−), z)) + c(τ, z) · 1{τ≤T}],
for some function φ : [0, T ]×S → R and Γ : S×Z → S is the impulse response function.
Of particular interest is the case when the intervention operator is applied to the
value function MV (·, x) — a quantity which represents the value of a strategy when the
controller performs an optimal intervention then behaves optimally thereafter given an
immediate optimal intervention taken at a state x ∈ S. The intuition behind (3.3) is as
follows: suppose at time τ− the system is at a state X(τ−) and an intervention z ∈ Z is
applied to the process, then a cost of c(τ, z) is incurred and the state then jumps from
X(τ−) to Γ(X(τ−), z). If the controller acts optimally thereafter, the cost of this strategy,
starting at state Γ(X(τ−), z) is V (τ,Γ(X(τ−), z) + c(τ, z). Lastly, choosing the action
that minimises costs leads to MV .
Remark 3.7. We note that whenever it is optimal for the controller to intervene,
MV = V since the value function describes the player payoff under optimal behaviour.
However, at any given point an immediate intervention may not be optimal, hence the
following inequality holds pointwise:
MV (s, x) ≥ V (s, x), ∀(s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S.(3.4)
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4. Preliminaries. Given the remarks of section III, we now define the value func-
tions of the game. As in [15], we define the value functions in terms of Elliot-Kalton
strategies introduced in [14]:
Value Functions.
V −(t, x) = inf
α∈A(0,T )
sup
ρ′∈T
J [t, x;α(ρ′), ρ′];(4.1)
V +(t, x) = sup
β∈B(0,T )
inf
u′∈U
J [t, x;u′, β(u′)], ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S,(4.2)
where α ∈ A(0,T ) and β ∈ B(0,T ) are player I and player II (non-anticipative) strategies
respectively (c.f. Definition 3.4), T is a given family of F−measurable stopping times
and U is the set of player I admissible impulse controls.
We refer to V − and V + as the upper and lower value functions respectively.
We say that the value of the game exists if we can commute the supremum and
infimum operators in (4.2) and (4.1) where after we can deduce the existence of a function
V ∈ H s.th. V (t, x) ≡ V −(t, x) = V +(t, x) for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×S. We use the notation
V ± to mean any element drawn from the set {V +, V −}.
Theorem 4.1. The value of the game exists and is given by:
(4.3) V (t, x) = V −(t, x) = V +(t, x), ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S.
Remark 4.2. By definition of the value functions, we automatically have:
(4.4) V −(t, x) ≥ V +(t, x), ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S.
To prove Theorem 4.1, it therefore remains to establish the reverse inequality of (4.4).
We now prove the regularity of the value functions associated to the game. Related
results can be found in [10] where the regularity (Lipschitzianity in the spatial variable,
Ho¨lder continuity in time) for the corresponding two-player impulse control game with
an uncontrolled process.
Lemma 4.3. The functions V − and V + can be equivalently expressed by the following:
V −(t, x) = inf
α∈A¯(t,T )
sup
ρ∈T \{t}
J [t, x;α(ρ), ρ],(4.5)
V +(t, x) = sup
β∈Bˆ(t,T )
inf
u∈U¯(t,T )
J [t, x;u, β(u)], ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S,(4.6)
where U¯(t,T ) is the set of player I admissible controls which have no impulses at time
t and correspondingly, A¯(t,T ) (resp., Bˆ(t,T ) is the set of all player I (resp., player II)
non-anticipative strategies with controls drawn from the set U¯(t,T ) (resp., T \{t}).
Proof. The proof of the lemma is similar to that of Lemma 3.3 in [10] with some
modifications:
The main idea is to prove that for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × S, there exists a control
u¯ ∈ U\U¯(0,T ) and an F− measurable stopping time ρ¯ ∈ T \t
′ where U¯(0,T ) ⊂ U is the
set of admissible impulse controls U which excludes impulses at time t′, for which the
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following inequality holds ∀u ∈ U , given some F−measurable stopping time ρ ∈ T and
for some ǫ > 0:
(4.7)
∣∣J [t′, x;u, β(u)]− J [t′, x; u¯, β¯(u¯)]∣∣+ |J [t′, x;α(ρ), ρ] − J [t′, x; α¯(ρ¯), ρ¯]| ≤ ǫ.
We prove the result for the case in which player I exercises only one intervention at
the point t since the extension to multiple interventions is straightforward.
W.l.o.g., we can employ the following short-hands β(u) ≡ ρ ∈ T , β¯(u¯) ≡ ρ¯ ∈
Tt′ , α(ρ) ≡ u ∈ U and α¯(ρ¯) ≡ u¯ ∈ U¯(0,T ). The result is proven by constructing the
following control and stopping times:
un = ξ · 1[τn,T ] + u
′,
where τn = (τ +
1
n ) · 1{τ=t′} + τ · 1{τ>t′} and
ρn =
(
ρ+
1
n
)
· 1{ρ=t′} + ρ · 1{ρ>t′},
where u′ =
∑
j≥1 ξj · 1[τj,T ].
Hence, we find that:
J [t′, x0;u, ρ]− J [t
′, x0;un, ρn]
= E
[ ∫ ρ∧τS
t′
f(s,Xt
′,x0,u
s )ds−
∫ ρn∧τS
t′
f(s,Xt
′,x0,un
s )ds−
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{ρ≤τj<ρn}
+
(
G(ρ ∧ τS , X
t′,x0,u
ρ∧τS )−G(ρn ∧ τS , X
t′,x0,un
ρn∧τS )
)
· 1{τS∧ρn<∞}
]
= E
[ ∫ ρ∧τS
t′
(
f(s,Xt
′,x0,u
s )− f(s,X
t′,x0,un
s )
)
ds−
∫ ρn∧τS
ρ∧τS
f(s,Xt
′,x0,un
s )ds
+
(
G(ρ ∧ τS , X
t′,x0,u
ρ∧τS )−G(ρn ∧ τS , X
t′,x0,un
ρn∧τS )
)
· 1{τS∧ρn<∞}
−
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{ρ≤τj<ρn}
]
.
We now readily observe that Xt
′,x0,un
s → X
t′,x0,u
s , P−a.s. Additionally, by construc-
tion, ρn → ρ as n→∞,P-a.s. hence, after invoking the dominated convergence theorem,
we can deduce the existence of an integer N ≥ 1 s.th. ∀ǫ > 0 and ∀n ≥ N such that:
(4.8) J [t′, x0;u, ρ]− J [t
′, x0;un, ρn] ≤ ǫ.
The proof can be extended to multiple impulse case (at time t′) straightforwardly after
employing conditions A3 (iii) and A3 (iv) where after the proof easily reduces to the
single impulse case.
Given Lemma 4.3, we can now seek to prove that the upper and lower value functions
associated to the game are Lipschitz continuous in the spatial variable and 12 -Ho¨lder
continuous in time, that is, we prove the following proposition:
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Proposition 4.4. We can deduce the existence of constants c1, c2 > 0 s.th. the
following results hold:
i. |V −(t, x′)− V −(t, x)| + |V +(t, x′)− V +(t, x)| ≤ c1|x
′ − x|,
ii. |V −(t′, x) − V −(t, x)| + |V +(t′, x) − V +(t, x)| ≤ c2|t
′ − t|
1
2 .
∀(t, x), (t′, x′) ∈ [0, T ]× S.
Proposition 4.4 establishes an important property of the game — small changes in the
input variables of the value functions lead to small changes in the game. This result is
crucial for deriving the DPP for the game which describes the behaviour of the value
function under infinitesimal variations.
Proof. We separate the proof into two parts, proving the spatial Lipschitzianity (i)
first, then the temporal 12 -Ho¨lder-continuity (ii) last.
To show that the value functions are Lipschitz continuous in the spatial variable, it
suffices to show that the property is satisfied for the function J .
The proof is straightforward since the result follows as an immediate consequence of
the Lipschitzianity of the constituent functions. In particular we have:
|J [t, x; ·, ·]− J [t, x′; ·, ·]|
≤ E
[∫ τs∧ρ
t
∣∣∣f(s,Xt,x,·s )− f(s,Xt,x′,·s )∣∣∣ ds+ ∣∣∣G(τS ∧ ρ,Xt,x,·τS∧ρ)−G(τS ∧ ρ,Xt,x′,·τS∧ρ)∣∣∣
]
≤ cf
∫ τs∧ρ
t
E
[∣∣∣Xt,x,·s −Xt,x′,·s ∣∣∣] ds+ cGE [∣∣∣Xt,x,·τS∧ρ −Xt,x′,·τS∧ρ∣∣∣] ,
∀(t, x′), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S,
where cf , cG > 0 are Lipschitz constants for the function f and G respectively (see
assumption A.1.2.). Therefore, as an immediate consequence of Lemma A.1, we see that
we can deduce the existence of a constant c > 0 s.th.
(4.9) |J [t, x; ·, ·]− J [t, x′; ·, ·]| ≤ c|x− x′|.
We note also that since the constituent functions of J are bounded, J is also bounded;
hence by (4.9) and by Lemma 3.6 in [8], we therefore conclude that:
(4.10) |V ±(t, x)− V ±(t, x′)| ≤ c|x− x′|,
for some constant c > 0 as required.
To show that the value functions are Lipschitz continuous in the temporal variable,
we show that (ii) is satisfied by the function V + with the proof for the function V − being
analogous.
We firstly note that:
V +(t′, x)− V +(t, x) = sup
µ∈B(0,T )
inf
u∈U
J [t′, x;u, µ(u)]− sup
µ∈B(0,T )
inf
u∈U
J [t, x;u, µ(u)]
∀(t, x′), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S.(4.11)
By (i), we can deduce the existence of some ǫ−optimal strategy µˆ ∈ B(0,T )
against V +(t, x) s.th. V +(t, x)−ǫ ≤ infu∈U J [t, x;u, µˆ(u)], ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×S where ǫ > 0
is arbitrary. Hence, by (4.11) we have that:
V +(t′, x) − V +(t, x)− 2ǫ ≤ inf
u∈U
J [t′, x;u, µˆ(u)]− inf
u∈U
J [t, x;u, µˆ(u)].(4.12)
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Let us now construct the control uǫ =
∑
j≥1 ξ
ǫ
j · 1[τǫj ,T ] which is associated with the
strategy αǫ ∈ A(0,T ). Let us also construct the control u
′
ǫ ∈ U[t′,T ] using the following
expression: u′ǫ =
∑
τǫj≤t
′ ξ
ǫ
j · 1t′ +
∑
τǫj>t
′ ξ
ǫ
j · 1[τǫj ,T ] which is associated to the strategy αˆ
ǫ
so that the control u′ǫ is simply the control uǫ ∈ U except that the impulse interventions
within the interval [t, t′[ are now pushed to t′.
Now thanks to Lemma 4.3, we have that |J [t, x;u, ·]− J [t, x; u¯, ·]| < ǫ where ǫ > 0 is
arbitrary and where u¯ ∈ U¯ is the set of player I admissible controls that have no impulses
at time t. Hence, by Lemma 4.3 and using the ǫ−optimality of the strategy µˆ ∈ B(0,T ),
we can therefore deduce the following inequality:
(4.13) V +(t′, x)− V +(t, x) − 3ǫ ≤ J [t′, x;u′ǫ, µ(u
′
ǫ)]− J [t, x;uǫ, µˆ(uǫ)].
Let us denote by ρˆ := µ(u′ǫ) ≡ µˆ(uǫ) and define ρ¯ ∈ T by:
(4.14) ρ¯ :=
{
t′, {ρˆ < t′}
ρˆ, {ρˆ ≥ t′}.
Hence, we have that:
J [t′, x;u′ǫ, µ¯(u
′
ǫ)]− J [t, x;uǫ, µˆ(uǫ)] = J [t
′, x;u′ǫ, ρ¯]− J [t, x;uǫ, ρˆ].
From which we can now calculate that:
J [t′, x;u′ǫ, ρ¯]− J [t, x;uǫ, ρˆ]
= −E
[∫ ρˆ∧τS
t
f(s,Xt,x,uǫs )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τ ǫj , ξ
ǫ
j) · 1{t<τǫj<ρˆ∧τS}
−
(
G
(
ρ¯ ∧ τS , X
t′,x,u′ǫ
ρ¯∧τS
)
−G
(
ρˆ ∧ τS , X
t,x,uǫ
ρˆ∧τS
))
· 1{ρˆ∧τs<∞}
]
· 1{ρˆ≤t′}
+E
[∫ ρˆ∧τS)
t′
f(s,X
t′,x,u′ǫ
s )ds−
∫ ρˆ∧τS
t
f(s,Xt,x,uǫs )ds
+
∑
j≥1
(
c
(
τ
′ǫ
j , ξ
′ǫ
j
)
· 1{t′<τ ′ǫj <k}
− c(τ ǫj , ξ
ǫ
j) · 1{t<τǫj<k}
)
· δkρˆ∧τS
+
(
G
(
ρ¯ ∧ τS , X
t′,x,u′ǫ
ρ¯∧τS
)
−G
(
ρˆ ∧ τS , X
t,x,uǫ
ρˆ∧τS
))
· 1{ρˆ∧τs<∞}
]
· 1{ρˆ>t′}
= E
[∫ ρˆ∧τS
t′
f(s,X
t′,x,u′ǫ
s )ds−
∫ ρˆ∧τS
t
f(s,Xt,x,uǫs )ds+ c

t′, ∑
τǫj≤t
′
ξǫj

− ∑
τǫj≤t
′
c
(
τ ǫj , ξ
ǫ
j
)
+
(
G
(
ρˆ ∧ τS , X
t′,x,u′ǫ
ρˆ∧τS
)
−G
(
ρˆ ∧ τS , X
t,x,uǫ
ρˆ∧τS
))
· 1{∞>ρˆ>t′}
+
(
G
(
ρˆ ∧ τS , X
t,x,uǫ
ρˆ∧τS
)
−G
(
ρ¯ ∧ τS , X
t′,x,u′ǫ
ρ¯∧τS
))
· 1{ρˆ≤t′<∞}
]
.
Now by assumption A.3, we have that:
(4.15)
∑
τǫj≤t
′
c(τ ǫj , ξ
ǫ
j) ≥ c(t
′,
∑
τǫj≤t
′
ξǫj).
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Hence, we find that:
J [t′, x;u′ǫ, µ¯(u
′
ǫ)]− J [t, x;uǫ, µˆ(uǫ)]
≤ E
[ ∫ ρˆ∧τS
t′
f(s,X
t′,x,u′ǫ
s )ds−
∫ ρˆ∧τS
t
f(s,Xt,x,uǫs )ds
]
+ sup
ρˆ∈{t′,ρˆ}
E
[∣∣∣G(ρˆ ∧ τS , Xt,x,uǫρˆ∧τS )−G(ρˆ ∧ τS , Xt′,x,u′ǫρˆ∧τS )
∣∣∣] ,
(4.16)
where we have used (4.15) to remove the cost terms. Now by the Lipschitz continuity of
G (c.f. A.1.2.) and Lemma A.1.3, we can deduce the existence of a constant c > 0 s.th.
∀s ∈ [0, T ] we have that:
(4.17) E
[∣∣∣G(s,Xt′,x,·s )−G(s,Xt,x,·s )∣∣∣] ≤ c sup
s∈[0,T ]
E
[∣∣∣Xt′,x,·s −Xt,x,·s ∣∣∣] ≤ c |t− t′| 12 ,
where c denotes some arbitrary constant (which may differ in each step of the proof).
Moreover, we can arrive at the result after observing a boundedness property of f and
invoking the Lipschitz property then appealing to the statements of Lemma A.1.3. Indeed,
using Fubini’s Theorem and interchanging the integral and expectation, we have that:
E
[ ∫ t′
t
f(s,Xt,x,·s )ds
]
≤ cE
[∫ t′
t
sup
s∈[t,t′]
(1 + |Xt,x,·s |)ds
]
= c
∫ t′
t
sup
s∈[t,t′]
(1 + E[|Xt,x,·s |])ds ≤ c(t
′ − t)(1 + |x|) ∈ L,(4.18)
for some c > 0 and where we have used the continuity of f . Therefore, E[
∫ t′
t f(·)ds] is
bounded from above by c(t′− t) for some c > 0. Using Fubini’s Theorem, we now observe
that we can deduce the existence of some constant c > 0 s.th.
E
[∫ ρˆ∧τS
t′
f(s,Xt
′,x,·
s )ds−
∫ ρˆ∧τS
t
f(s,Xt,x,·s )ds
]
≤ E
[∣∣∣∣∣
∫ ρ′∧τS
t
f(s,Xt
′,x,·
s )− f(s,X
t,x,·
s )ds+
∫ t′
t
f(s,Xt,x,·s )ds
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ c
∫ τS
t
E|Xt
′,x,·
s −X
t,x,·
s |ds+ c
∫ t′
t
sup
s∈[t,t′]
(1 + E[|Xt,x,·s |])ds ≤ c|t− t
′|
1
2 ,(4.19)
using the Lipschitzianity of f , (4.18) and (ii) and (iii) of Lemma A.1.3.
Hence, after plugging (4.19) and (4.17) into (4.16) and (4.13), we can deduce that
there exists a constant c > 0 s.th. for ǫ > 0 the following estimate holds:
V +(t, x) − V +(t′, x) ≤ |J [t′, x;u′ǫ, µ¯(u
′
ǫ)]− J [t, x;uǫ, µˆ(uǫ)]|+ 3ǫ ≤ c|t− t
′|
1
2 + 3ǫ.
(4.20)
Now, since ǫ in (4.20) is arbitrary, we can deduce the existence of a constant c > 0 s.th.
(4.21) |V +(t, x)− V +(t′, x)| ≤ c|t− t′|
1
2 , ∀(t, x), (t′, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S,
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after which we deduce (ii) holds for the function V +.
To deduce that (ii) holds for the function V −, we note that analogous to (4.11), we
have that:
(4.22) V −(t′, x)− V −(t, x) = inf
α∈A(0,T )
sup
ρ∈T
J [t′, x;α(ρ), ρ] − inf
α∈A(0,T )
sup
ρ∈T
J [t, x;α(ρ), ρ].
In a similar way to the proof of (ii) for V + we can deduce the existence of a constant
c > 0 s.th.
(4.23) |V −(t, x) − V −(t′, x)| ≤ c|t− t′|
1
2 ,
from which we deduce the thesis.
The following proposition establishes the boundedness of the value functions:
Proposition 4.5. The value functions V ± are both bounded.
Proof. We do the proof for the function V − with the proof for V + being analogous.
Recall that:
V −(t0, x0) = inf
α∈A(0,T )
sup
ρ∈T
E
[ ∫ ρ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,α(ρ)s )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj(ρ), ξj(ρ)) · 1{τj(ρ)≤ρ∧τS}
+G(ρ ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,α(ρ)
ρ∧τS )1{ρ∧τS<∞}
]
.(4.24)
Now let u0 ∈ U be the player I control with which no impulses exercised. Then
(4.25) Xt0,x0,uτS ≡ X
t0,x0,u0
τS +
µ[t0,T ](u)∑
j=1
ξj .
If we denote by Y t0,x0,uτS := X
t0,x0,u0
τS +
∑
j≥1 ξj · 1{τj<τS∧ρ} and using Lemma A.1.3 and
by Gronwall’s lemma we have that:
E
[
G(τS , Y
t0,x0,α(ρ)
τS )−G(τS , X
t0,x0,u0
τS )
]
≤ c2E[|Y
t0,x0,α(ρ)
τS −X
t0,x0,u0
τS |]
≤ c1E[((ρ ∧ τS)− t0)
1
2 )],
for some c1, c2 > 0. Moreover, since u ∈ U (hence E[µ[t0,T ](u)] < ∞) we can find some
λ > 0 s.th.
∑
j≥1 c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj<τS∧ρ} ≤ λ and hence:
E

∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj<τS∧ρ} +G(ρ ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,α(ρ)
ρ∧τS )


= E
[∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj<τS∧ρ} +
(
(G(τS , Y
t0,x0,α(ρ)
τS )−G(τS , X
t0,x0,u0
τS )
)
+G(τS , X
t0,x0,u0
τS ))
]
≤ E
[
G(τS , X
t0,x0,u0
τS ) + λ+ c1((ρ ∧ τS)− t0)
1
2
]
.
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Since by similar reasoning we can deduce that E
[∫ ρ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds
]
≤ E[
∫ ρ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,u0s )ds + c((ρ ∧ τS) − t0)
1
2 · 1{µ[t0,τS ](u)}] for some c > 0; using the
continuity of the functions f and G we find that:
V −(t0, x0) ≤ sup
ρ∈T
E
[ ∫ ρ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,u0s )ds+G(τS , X
t0,x0,u0
τS ) · 1{ρ∧τs<∞}
+ (λ+ c1|(ρ ∧ τS)− t0|
1
2 ) · 1{µ[t0,τS ](u)}
]
≤ sup
ρ∈T
E
[∫ ρ∧τS
t0
c2(1 + E[|X
t0,x0,u0
s |])ds+ c3(1 + E[|X
t0,x0,u0
ρ∧τS |])
+
(
λ+ c1|(ρ ∧ τS)− t0|
1
2
)
· 1{µ[t0,τS ](u)}
]
≤ sup
ρ∈T
E
[
α+ (λ+ c1|(ρ ∧ τS)− t0|
1
2 ) · 1{µ[t0,τS ](u)}
]
,
using Lemma A.1.3 and where α := ((ρ ∧ τS) − t0) · [c2 + c3](1 + |x|) and c1 > 0 and
c2 > 0 are constants. We then deduce the thesis since each of the terms inside the square
bracket is bounded.
Lemma 4.6. Let V ∈ H be a bounded function and (τ, x) ∈ [0, T ]×S where τ is some
F− measurable stopping time, then the set Ξ(τ, x) defined by:
(4.26) Ξ(τ, x) :=
{
ξ ∈ Z :MV (τ−, x) = V (τ, x + ξ) + c(τ, ξ) · 1{τ≤T}
}
is non-empty.
The proof of the lemma is straightforward since we need only prove that the infimum is
in fact a minimum. This follows directly from the fact that the cost function is minimally
bounded (c.f. A.4.) and that the value functions are also bounded by Proposition 4.5.
A proof of the following lemma is reported in [28], Lemma 3.6 and similar result may
be found in (Lemma 3.10 in [9]):
We give the following result without demonstration:
Lemma 4.7. The non-local intervention operator M is continuous wherein we can
deduce the existence of a constants c1, c2 > 0 s.th. when s < s
′ with:
1. |MV ±(s, x)−MV ±(s, y)| ≤ c1|x− y|,
2. |MV ±(t, x)−MV ±(s, x)]| ≤ c2|t− s|
1
2 , ∀(t, x), (s, y) ∈ [0, T ]× S.
5. A Viscosity Theoretic Approach. We now approach problem (3.1) using a
viscosity theory approach. We shall firstly start by proving the existence of a value of the
game and that the value is a unique viscosity solution to the HJBI equation, some ideas
for the proofs in the section come from [10], [8, 16].
The outline of the scheme is as follows:
i. Using the DPP for each of the value functions, prove that the upper (resp., lower)
value function is a viscosity subsolution (resp., supersolution) to the HJBI equation
(3.1).
ii. Prove a comparison theorem and the reverse inequality of (4.4) therefore proving
equality of the value functions.
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iii. Using (ii), deduce the existence of a value of the game and that the value is a unique
solution to the HJBI equation.
Let us therefore now introduce some key definitions relating to viscosity solutions:
Definition 5.1. A locally bounded lower (resp., upper) semicontinuous function ψ :
[0, T ]×S → R is a viscosity supersolution (resp., subsolution) to the HJBI equation (3.1)
if:
For any (s, x) ∈ [0, T ] × S and ψ ∈ C1,2([0, T ];S) s.th. (s, x) is a local minimum
(resp., maximum) of V − ψ, we have that:
max
{
min
[
−
∂ψ
∂s
(s, x)− (Lψ(s, x) + f(s, x)) , ψ(s, x) −G(s, x)
]
, ψ(s, x)−Mψ(s, x)
}
≥ 0
(resp., ≤ 0).(5.1)
A locally bounded lower (resp., upper) semicontinuous function ψ : [0, T ] × S → R is a
viscosity solution to the HJBI equation (3.1) if it is both a subsolution and supersolution
of (5.1).
Remark 5.2. If the value functions are known a priori to be continuous (or deter-
ministic or in the discrete case) derivation of the DPP is straightforward. Otherwise, in
general, we must use one of two arguments: a measurable selection argument or establish
the regularity of the value functions then construct a measurable selection i.e. partition
the state space then construct a measurable selection (this uses the Lindelo¨f property of
the canonical space).
We now state the dynamic programming principle for the game:
Theorem 5.3 (Dynamic programming principle for stochastic differential games of
control and stopping with Impulse Controls). Let u ∈ U be an admissible player I control
and suppose ρ ∈ T is an F−measurable stopping time, then for a sufficiently small h the
following variants of the DPP hold for the functions V + and V −:
V −(t0, x0)
= inf
α∈A(0,T )
sup
ρ∈T
E
[ ∫ (t0+h)∧ρ
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,α(ρ)s )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj(ρ), ξj(ρ)) · 1{τj(ρ)≤(t0+h)∧ρ}
+G(ρ ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,α(ρ)
ρ∧τS ) · 1{ρ∧τS≤t0+h} + V
−((t0 + h) ∧ ρ,X
t0,x0,α(ρ)
t0+h
) · 1{ρ∧τS>t0+h}
]
and
V +(t0, x0)
= sup
β∈B(0,T )
inf
u∈U
E
[ ∫ (t0+h)∧β(u)
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤(t0+h)∧β(u)}
+G(β(u) ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,u
β(u)∧τS
) · 1{β(u)∧τS≤t0+h}
+V −((t0 + h) ∧ β(u), X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
) · 1{β(u)∧τS>t0+h}
]
.
∀(t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ]× S.
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Intuitively, the DPP states that if we compute the optimal controls on the intervals
[t0, t0+h] and [t0+h, t
′] for some h < (t′∧ρ)− t0 for any t
′ ∈ [0, T ], then we would obtain
the same result as that which we would obtain if we computed the optimal controls for
the interval [t0, t
′] as a whole.
A classical consequence of the DPP (5.3) and (5.3) is that we find that the function
V − (resp., V +) is the subsolution (resp., supersolution) to an associated HJBI equation,
namely (3.1). Moreover, if the game admits a value V with V ∈ C1,2([0, T ],Rp), then the
V is a classical solution to an associated HJBI equation.
Proof. We begin by proving:
V +(t0, x0)
≥ sup
β∈B(0,T )
inf
u∈U
E
[∫ (t0+h)∧β(u)∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj<t0+h∧β(u)∧τS}
+G
(
β(u) ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,u
β(u)∧τS
)
· 1{β(u)∧τS≤t0+h}
]
+ V +((t0 + h) ∧ β(u), X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
) · 1{β(u)∧τS>t0+h},
for some ∞ > h > 0.
Having established the uniform continuity of the functions V − and V +, a countable
selection argument is sufficient in order to derive the DPP, therefore avoiding measurable
selection arguments directly. Indeed, using Proposition 4.4, we can find a set of controls
that produce values of J that are arbitrarily close to the values of V − and V + at some
given point.
Hence, let (Aj)j∈N be a partition of Rp. Let µˆ ∈ B(0,T ) be some ǫ−optimal strategy
against sup
β(u)∈B(0,T)
inf
u∈U
V +(t0+h∧β(u), X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
). Note by Lemma A.1 we can deduce that
since µˆ is an ǫ−optimal strategy against supβ(u)∈B(0,T) infu∈U
V +(t0+h∧β(u), X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
) then
there exists some 2ǫ−optimal strategy µˆx ∈ B(0,T ) against supβ(u)∈B(0,T ) infu∈U V
+(t0 +
h ∧ β(u), x) s.th.
sup
β(u)∈B(0,T )
inf
u∈U
V +(t0+h∧β(u), x)− (ǫ+δ) ≤ inf
u∈U
J [t0+h, x;u[t0+h,T ], µˆ
x(u[t0+h,T ])] where
ǫ > δ > 0. Hence, we deduce that the strategy µˆx is a 2ǫ−optimal strategy infu∈U V
+(t0+
h ∧ β(u), y) for all y ∈ Bδ(x) within some radius 0 < δ < ǫ.
Let us therefore construct the strategy µ by:
(5.2) µˆ(u)(s) =
{
µ(u)(s), s ∈ [t0, t0 + h[
µˆx(u[t0+h,T ])(s)), s ∈ [t0 + h, T ], X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
∈ Bδ(x)
Now for any (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ] × S, u ∈ U , µ ∈ B(0,T ) and ∀u[t0+h,T ] ∈ U(t0+h,T ) using
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Lemma 4.3, for some sufficiently small h > 0, we have:
E
[ ∫ µˆ(u)∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τ ′j , ξ
′
j) · 1{τ ′j≤µˆ(u)∧τS}
+G
(
µˆ(u) ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,u
µˆ(u)∧τS
)
· 1{µˆ(u)∧τS<∞}
]
≥ E
[∫ (t0+h)∧µ(u)∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤(t0+h)∧µ(u)∧τS}
+G
(
µ(u) ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,u
µ(u)∧τS
)
· 1{µ(u)∧τS<t0+h}
]
+E
[∫ µˆ(u)∧τS
t0+h
f(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τ ′j , ξ
′
j) · 1{µˆ(u)∧τS≥τ ′j>t0+h}
+G
(
µˆ(u) ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,u
µˆ(u)∧τS
)
· 1{µˆ(u)∧τS<∞}
]
· 1{µˆ(u)∧τS>t0+h} − ǫ,
(5.3)
for some arbitrary ǫ > 0. Using the properties of X , we can further rewrite (5.3) as:
E
[ ∫ (t0+h)∧µ(u)∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤(t0+h)∧µ(u)∧τS}
+G
(
µ(u) ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,u
µ(u)∧τS
)
· 1{µ(u)∧τS≤t0+h}
]
+E
[∫ µˆ(u[t0+h,τS ])∧τS
t0+h
f(s,X
t0+h,X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
,u[t0+h,τS ]
s )ds
+
∑
j≥1
c(τ ′j , ξ
′
j) · 1{µˆ(u[t0+h,τS ])∧τS≥τ
′
j>t0+h
}
+G
(
µˆ(u[t0+h,τS]) ∧ τS , X
t0+h,X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
,u[t0+h,τS ]
µˆ(u[t0+h,τS ])∧τS
)
·1{µˆ(u[t0+h,τS ])∧τS<∞}]
·1{µˆ(u[t0+h,τS ])∧τS≥t0+h} − ǫ.
(5.4)
We now exploit the regularity of V (Proposition 4.4) and the ǫ−optimality of µ by which
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we deduce that:
E
[∫ µˆ(u[t0+h,τS ])∧τS
t0+h
f(s,X
t0+h,X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
,u[t0+h,τS ]
s )ds
+
∑
j≥1
c(τ ′j , ξ
′
j) · 1{µˆ(u[t0+h,τS ])∧τS≥τ
′
j>t0+h}
+G
(
µˆ(u[t0+h,τS]) ∧ τS , X
t0+h,X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
,u[t0+h,τS ]
µˆ(u[t0+h,τS ])∧τS
)
· 1{µˆ(u[t0+h,τS ])∧τS≥t0+h}
]
− ǫ
≥
∑
j∈N
E
[ ∫ µˆ(u)∧τS
t0+h
f(s,X
t0+h,y
j,u[t0+h,τS ]
s )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τ ′j , ξ
′
j) · 1{µˆ(u)∧τS≥τ ′j≥t0+h}
+G
(
µˆ(u) ∧ τS , X
t0+h,y
j,u[t0+h,τS ]
µˆ(u)∧τS
)
· 1{µˆ(u[t0+h,τS ])∧τS≥t0+h}
]
− cδ − ǫ
≥ V +(t0 + h ∧ µˆ(u), X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
)− 2ǫ− cδ,(5.5)
using the ǫ−optimality of the strategy µˆ against
supβ∈B(0,T ) infu∈U V
+(t0 + h ∧ β(u), X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
). Hence, putting (5.5) together with (5.4),
we find that:
E
[ ∫ (t0+h)∧µ(u)∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤(t0+h)∧µ(u)}
+G(µ(u) ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,u
µ(u) ) · 1{µ(u)∧τS≤t0+h}]
+E
[∫ µ(u)∧τS
t0+h
f(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{µ(u)∧τS≥τj>t0+h}
+G(µ(u) ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,u
µ(u)∧τS
) · 1{µ(u)∧τS<∞}
]
· 1{µ(u)≥t0+h}
≥ E
[∫ (t0+h)∧µ(u)∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤(t0+h)∧µ(u)∧τS}
+G(µ(u) ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,u
µ(u)∧τS
) · 1{µ(u)∧τS≤t0+h}
+V +(t0 + h ∧ µˆ(u), X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
) · 1{µˆ(u)∧τS>t0+h}
]
− cδ − 2ǫ,
from which after successively applying the inf and sup operators we deduce the first result
since δ and ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily.
We prove the reverse inequality in an analogous manner, in particular, we now prove
inequality for the function V −. Indeed, by Proposition 4.4, we can deduce the existence
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of a strategy α(1,ǫ) ∈ A(0,T ) against V
−(t, x) s.th.
inf
α∈A(0,T )
sup
ρ∈T
E
[ ∫ (t0+h)∧ρ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,α(ρ)s )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤(t0+h)∧ρ∧τS}
+G(ρ ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,α(ρ)
ρ∧τS ) · 1{ρ∧τS≤t0+h} + V
−(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α(ρ)
t0+h
)
·1{ρ>t0+h}
]
≥E
[ ∫ (t0+h)∧ρ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ)
s )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τ1,ǫj , ξ
1,ǫ
j ) · 1{τ1,ǫj ≤(t0+h)∧ρ∧τS}
+G(ρ ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ))
ρ∧τS · 1{ρ∧τS≤t0+h} + V
−(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ)
t0+h
· 1{ρ∧τS>t0+h}
]
−ǫ,
(5.6)
where we have used the shorthand τj(ρ) ≡ τj and ξj(ρ) ≡ ξj , ∀j ∈ N.
We now build the strategy α by:
α(ρ)(s) =
{
α(1,ǫ)(ρ)(s), s ∈ [t0, t0 + h[
αAi(ρ′)(s), s ∈ [t0 + h, T ], X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)
t0+h
∈ Ai,
where we have used ρ′ to denote the player II stopping time s.th. ρ′ ∈ T(t0+h,T ) ⊂
[t0+h, T ]. Let α
(2,ǫ) ∈ A(0,T ) be an ǫ−optimal strategy against supρ∈T V
−((t0+h)∧ρ, x).
Using Lemma 4.3 and by similar reasoning as in part (i), we can also deduce the existence
of a strategy αAi ∈ A(t0+h,T ) s.th. ∀y ∈ Ai, ρ
′ ∈ T(t0+h,T ) and some ǫ > 0, the following
inequality holds:
(5.7) V −((t0 + h) ∧ ρ, y) ≥ J [(t0 + h) ∧ ρ, y;α
Ai(ρ′)]− ǫ.
We therefore observe that:
E
[
V −
(
t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ′)
t0+h
)]
= E

∑
i≥1
V −
(
t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ′)
t0+h
)
· 1
{X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ′))
t0+h
∈Ai}


≥ E

∑
i≥1
J
[
t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ′)
t0+h
;αAi(ρ′), ρ′
]
· 1
{X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ′)
t0+h
∈Ai}

− ǫ
= J

t0 + h,Xt0,x0,α(1,ǫ)(ρ′)t0+h ;∑
i≥1
αAi(ρ′) · 1
{X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ′)
t0+h
∈Ai}
, ρ′

− ǫ.(5.8)
Let us now construct the strategy α¯(2,ǫ)(ρ) ∈ A¯(t0 + h) defined by:
α¯(2,ǫ)(ρ) :=
∑
i≥1 α
Ai(ρ′) ·1
{X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ′)
t0+h
∈Ai}
. Now, after introducing the strategy α¯(2,ǫ)
20 DAVID MGUNI
to (5.8), we deduce that:
E
[ ∫ (t0+h)∧ρ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ)
s )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τ1,ǫj , ξ
1,ǫ
j ) · 1{τ1,ǫj ≤(t0+h)∧ρ∧τS}
+G
(
ρ ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ)
ρ∧τS
)
· 1{ρ∧τS≤t0+h} + V
−
(
t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ)
t0+h
)
·1{ρ∧τS>t0+h}
]
− ǫ
≥E
[ ∫ (t0+h)∧ρ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ)
s )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τ1,ǫj , ξ
1,ǫ
j ) · 1{τ1,ǫj ≤(t0+h)∧ρ∧τS}
+G
(
ρ ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ)
ρ∧τS
)
· 1{ρ∧τS≤t0+h} + J
[
t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ′)
t0+h
; α¯(2,ǫ)(ρ′), ρ′
]
·1{ρ∧τS>t0+h}
]
− 2ǫ.
(5.9)
We lastly construct the strategy αǫ ∈ A(t0) which consists of the strategy α
(1,ǫ) which is
played up to time t0 + h at which point the strategy α¯
(2,ǫ) is then played.
Hence, after putting (5.9) and (5.6) together we observe that:
V −(t0, x0)
(5.10)
≥ E
[ ∫ (t0+h)∧ρ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ)
s )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τ1,ǫj , ξ
1,ǫ
j ) · 1{τ1,ǫj ≤(t0+h)∧ρ∧τS}
+G(ρ,Xt0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ))
ρ · 1{ρ∧τS≤t0+h} + V
−(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α
(1,ǫ)(ρ)
t0+h
)
·1{ρ∧τS>t0+h}
]
− ǫ
≥ E
[ ∫ (t0+h)∧ρ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,α
ǫ(ρ)
s )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τ ǫj , ξ
ǫ
j) · 1{τǫj≤(t0+h)∧ρ∧τS}
+G(ρ ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,α
ǫ(ρ)
ρ∧τS ) · 1{ρ∧τS≤t0+h} + J
[
t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α
ǫ(ρ′)
t0+h
;αǫ(ρ′), ρ′
]
·1{ρ∧τS>t0+h}
]
− 2ǫ.
(5.11)
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Moreover, since ǫ is arbitrary, we readily deduce that:
V −(t0, x0)
≥ inf
α∈A(0,T )
sup
ρ∈T
E
[∫ (t0+h)∧ρ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,α(ρ)s )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤(t0+h)∧ρ∧τS}
+G(ρ ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,α(ρ)
ρ∧τS ) · 1{ρ∧τS≤t0+h} + V
−(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α(ρ)
t0+h
) · 1{ρ∧τS>t0+h}
]
,
from which we readily deduce the required result. We can prove the reverse inequality in
an analogous manner for which, in conjunction with (5.3) proves the thesis.
A classical consequence of the dynamic programming principles (5.3) and (5.3) is
that we find that the function V − (resp., V +) is the subsolution (resp., supersolution)
to an associated HJBI equation, namely (3.1). Moreover, if the game admits a value V ,
s.th. V ∈ C1,2([0, T ][0, T ],Rp), then the V is a classical solution to an associated HJBI
equation.
The following lemma characterises the conditions in which the value of the game
satisfies a HJBI equation:
Lemma 5.4. The function V − is a viscosity supersolution of (3.1) and the V + is a
viscosity subsolution of (3.1).
Proof. The lemma is proven by contradiction.
We begin by proving that V + is a viscosity subsolution of (3.1).
Suppose ψ : [0, T ] × S → R is a test function with ψ ∈ C1,2([0, T ], S) and (t, x) ∈
[0, T ]×S are s.th. V +−ψ attains a local minimum at (t, x) with V +(t, x)−ψ(t, x) = 0. We
note that it remains only to show that ∀(s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×S, ∂ψ∂s (s, x)+Lψ(s, x)+f(s, x) ≥ 0
whenever ψ(s, x)−G(s, x) > 0 which, as we now show, follows as a classical consequence
of the DPP.
Indeed, by Proposition 4.4 we can deduce the existence of a ǫ−optimal strategy
αǫ ∈ A(0,T ) to which the associated control is α
ǫ(v) ≡ uǫ ∈ U (against V +(t0, x0)) s.th.
ψ(t0, x0) = V
+(t0, x0)
≥ inf
u∈U
E
[ ∫ τS∧ρ
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤τS∧ρ}
+G(τS ∧ ρ,X
t0,x0,u
τS ) · 1{τS∧ρ<t0+h} + V
+(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
) · 1{t0+h=ρ}
]
≥ E
[ ∫ τS∧ρ
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,uǫs )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τ ǫj , ξ
ǫ
j) · 1{τj≤τS∧ρ}
+G(τS ∧ ρ,X
t0,x0,uǫ
τS∧ρ ) · 1{τS∧ρ<t0+h} + V
+(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,uǫ
t0+h
) · 1{t0+h=ρ}
]
−ǫh.
(5.12)
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Let us now define:
φ[h](t0, x0) := E
[ ∫ τs∧ρ
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,u0s )ds+G(τS ∧ ρ,X
t0,x0,u0
τS∧ρ ) · 1{τS∧ρ<t0+h}
+ ψ(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,u0
t+h ) · 1{t0+h=ρ}
]
,(5.13)
where u0 ∈ U is the player I control s.th. no impulses are exercised. We firstly wish to
show that given ǫ > 0 we have that:
(5.14) ψ(t0, x0) ≥ φ
[h](t0, x0)− 2ǫh.
Indeed, we firstly note that:
(5.15) Xt0,x0,uǫt0+h ≡ X
t0,x0,u0[t0,t0+h]
t0+h
+
µ[t0,t0+h](uǫ)∑
j=1
ξǫj .
We now exploit the regularity of V and the boundedness of the sequence of intervention
costs, indeed we have that:
E
[∑
j≥1
c(τ ǫj , ξ
ǫ
j) · 1{τǫj≤(t0+h)∧ρ} + V
+(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,uǫ
t0+h
) · 1{t0+h=ρ}
]
≥ E
[
(V +(t0 + h,X
t0,x0
t0+h
) + (λ− c(ρ− t0)
β) · 1µ[t0,t0+h](uǫ)≥1 · 1{t0+h=ρ}
]
≥ E[(ψ(t0 + h,X
t0,x0
t0+h
) + (λ− c(ρ− t0)
β) · 1µ[t0,t0+h](uǫ)≥1 · 1{t0+h=ρ}],(5.16)
where we have used the fact that
∑
j≥1 infz∈Z c(τ
ǫ
j , z) ≥ λ · 1µ[t0,t0+h](uǫ) for some λ > 0
and that if X ′ ≡ X
t0,x0,u0[t0,t0+h]
t0+h
+
∑µ[t0,t0+h](uǫ)
j=1 ξ
ǫ
j , we have that V
+(t0 + h,X
t0,x0
t0+h
) =
V +(t0 + h,X
′) + (V +(t0 + h,X
t0,x0
t0+h
)− V +(t0 + h,X
′)) ≤ V +(t0 + h,X
′) + ch
1
2 for some
c > 0 using Lemma A.3. and Gronwall’s lemma. Using the same arguments we can
similarly deduce that there exists some constant c > 0 such that:
G(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,uǫ
t0+h
) + f(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,uǫ
t0+h
) ≥ f(t0 + h,X
t0,x0
t0+h
) +G(t0 + h,X
t0,x0
t0+h
)− ch
1
2 .
(5.17)
Now, since (λ− c(ρ− t0)
1
2 ) · 1µ[t0,t0+h](uǫ)≥1 · 1{t0+h=ρ} = (λ− ch
1
2 ) · 1µ[t0,t0+h](uǫ)≥1 and
since there exists s¯ ∈]t0, T [ s.th. for h ∈ [t0, s¯] for any ǫ > 0 we have that:
(5.18) (λ− ch
1
2 ) · 1µ[t0,t0+h](uǫ)≥1 ≥ −ǫh,
we observe that after inserting (5.18) and (5.17) into (5.16) and (5.12), we deduce that
(5.14) does indeed hold.
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Hence, combining (5.13) and (5.14) we find that:
ψ(t0, x0) = V
+(t0, x0)
≥ inf
u∈U
E
[ ∫ τS∧ρ
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,us )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤τS∧ρ}
+G(τS ∧ ρ,X
t0,x0,u
τS ) · 1{τS∧ρ<t0+h} + V
+(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,u
t0+h
) · 1{t0+h=ρ}
]
≥ E
[ ∫ τS∧ρ
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,uǫs )ds+G(τS ∧ ρ,X
t0,x0,uǫ
τS∧ρ ) · 1{τS∧ρ<t0+h}
+ ψ(t0 + h,X
t0,x0
t0+h
) · 1{t0+h=ρ}
]
− 2ǫh.
(5.19)
Let us now define as Λ(s, x) := ( ∂∂s + L)ψ(s, x). By Ito¯’s formula for ca`dla`g semi-
martingale processes (see for example Theorem II.33 of [22]), we have that:
ψ(t0, x0) = ψ(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,uǫ
t0+h
)−
∫ t0+h∧τS∧ρ
t0
〈
∇xψ(s,X
t0,x0,uǫ
s ), µ(s,X
t0,x0,uǫ
s )
〉
dBs
−
∫ t0+h∧τS∧ρ
t0
Λ(s,Xt0,x0,uǫs )ds.(5.20)
In order to generate a contradiction, we assume that G(s, x) − V +(s, x) = G(s, x) −
ψ(s, x) ≥ 0 and suppose that the supposition of the lemma is false so that Λ(s, x) +
f(s, x) > 0. We can therefore consider constants a, h, δ > 0 s.th. ∀(s, x) ∈ [t0, t0 + h] ×
Ba(x) s.th. G(s, x)− ψ(s, x) ≥ δ and Λ(s, x) + f(s, x) ≥ δ .
Let us now define the set E := {infs∈[t0,t0+h] |X
t0,x0,·
s − x| > a} then using Lemma
A.1.3 (i.e. the 12 -Ho¨lder continuity of X) and by Tchebyshev’s inequality, we can deduce
the existence of a constant c > 0 that depends only on the parameters of Xt0,x0,·s s.th.
P[E] ≤ infs∈[t0,t0+h]
c(s−t0)
2
a4 ≤
ch2
a4 .
Then since
(5.21) E
[
ψ(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,uǫ
t0+h
)
]
− ψ(t0, x0) = E
[∫ (t0+h)∧τS
t0
Λ(s,Xt0,x0,uǫs )ds
]
,
we have that:
−ψ(t0, x0) = E
[
1Ec ·
(∫ (t0+h)∧τS
t0
Λ(s,Xt0,x0,uǫs )ds− ψ(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,uǫ
t0+h
)
)]
+ E
[
1E ·
(∫ (t0+h)∧τS
t0
Λ(s,Xt0,x0,uǫs )ds− ψ(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,uǫ
t0+h
)
)]
≥ E
[
1Ec ·
(∫ (t0+h)∧τS
t0
Λ(s,Xt0,x0,uǫs )ds− ψ(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,uǫ
t0+h
)
)]
−
ch2
a4
.
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Hence, by the given assumptions, we have that:
− ψ(t0, x0)(5.22)
≥ E
[
1Ec ·
(∫ t0+h∧τS
t0
(δ − f(s,Xt0,x0,uǫs ))ds
+
(
δ −G(τS ∧ ρ,X
t0,x0,uǫ
τS∧ρ )
)
· 1{ρ<t0+h} − ψ(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,uǫ
t0+h
) · 1{t0+h=ρ}
)]
−
ch2
a4
≥E
[
δ
(
h+ E[1{ρ<t0+h}]
)
−
∫ t0+h∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,uǫs )ds
−G(τS ∧ ρ,X
t0,x0,uǫ
τS∧ρ ) · 1{τS∧ρ<t0+h} − ψ(t0 + h,X
t0,x0
t0+h
) · 1{t0+h=ρ}
]
−2
ch2
a4
− ǫh.
(5.23)
Therefore combining (5.23) and (5.19) and after rearranging we find that:
(5.24)
2ch2
a4
+ 3ǫh ≥ E
[
δ
(
h+ E[1{ρ<t0+h}
)
]
]
.
Since E
[
h+ 1{ρ<t0+h}
]
≥ h using (5.24) we readily deduce that:
(5.25)
1
2
δh ≤
ch2
a4
+
3
2
ǫh.
After which after dividing through by h we find that:
(5.26)
1
2
δ −
(
c
a4
h+
3
2
ǫ
)
≤ 0.
We then deduce the result since both h and ǫ can be made arbitrarily small which implies
(5.26) yields a contradiction.
Next we prove that V − is a viscosity supersolution of (3.1). As in part (i), we prove
the result by generating a contradiction, hence now suppose ψ : [0, T ]× S → R is a test
function with ψ ∈ C1,2([0, T ], S) and suppose (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×S is s.th. MV −−ψ attains
a local maximum at (t, x).
In order to generate a contradiction, we assume that MV −(s, x) − V −(s, x) =
MV −(s, x)− ψ(s, x) ≤ 0 and suppose that the supposition of the lemma is false so that
−Λ(s, x)− f(s, x) > 0, and consider constants h, δ > 0 s.th. ∀(s, x) ∈ [t0, t0 + h]×Bh(x)
and MV −(s, x) − ψ(s, x) ≤ −δ and Λ(s, x) + f(s, x) ≤ −δ. By Proposition 4.4, we
can deduce the existence of an ǫ−optimal strategy βǫ ∈ B(0,T ) to which the associated
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stopping time is βǫ(u) ≡ ρǫ ∈ T for all u ∈ U (against V −) s.th.
ψ(t0, x0) ≤ sup
ρ∈T
E
[ ∫ (t0+h)∧ρ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,α(ρ)s )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj<(t0+h)∧ρ∧τS}
+G(ρ ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,α(ρ)
ρ∧τS ) · 1{ρ∧τS≤t0+h} + V
−(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α(ρ)
t0+h
) · 1{ρ∧τS>t0+h}
]
≤E
[∫ (t0+h)∧ρǫ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,α(ρ
ǫ)
s )ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj<(t0+h)∧ρǫ∧τS}
+G(ρǫ ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,α(ρ
ǫ)
ρǫ∧τS ) · 1{ρǫ∧τS≤t0+h} + V
−(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α(ρ
ǫ)
t0+h
) · 1{ρǫ∧τS>t0+h}
]
+ǫh.
(5.27)
After re-employing the estimate (5.14), we find that:
ψ(t0, x0) ≤ E
[∫ (t0+h)∧ρǫ∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,u0s )ds+G(ρ
ǫ ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,u0
ρǫ∧τS ) · 1{ρǫ∧τS≤t0+h}
+V −(t0 + h,X
t0+h,u0
t0+h
) · 1{ρǫ∧τS>t0+h}
]
+2ǫh.
(5.28)
Now by Remark 3.7, we have that −δ ≥MV −(s, x)− ψ(s, x) ≥ V −(s, x)− ψ(s, x); that
is ψ(s, x) ≥ V −(s, x) + δ, ∀(s, x) ∈ [t0, t0 + h]×Bh(x). Using the definition of Λ and the
set E introduced earlier and, again applying Ito¯’s formula, by similar reasoning as part
(i), we find that:
ψ(t0, x0) ≥ E
[( ∫ (t0+h)∧τS
t0
−Λ(s,Xt0,x0,α(ρ
ǫ)
s )ds+ ψ(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α(ρ
ǫ)
t0+h
)
)
· 1Ec
]
−
ch2
a4
≥ E
[( ∫ (t0+h)∧τS
t0
(
δ + f(s,Xt0,x0,α(ρ
ǫ)
s )
)
ds+ V −(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α(ρ
ǫ)
t0+h
)
)
· 1Ec
]
+δ −
ch2
a4
.
(5.29)
Employing similar reasoning as in part (i), and again re-employing the estimate (5.14)
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we find that:
ψ(t0, x0) ≥ E
[
δ
(
h+ E[1{ρǫ<t0+h}]
)
+
∫ (t0+h)∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,α(ρ
ǫ)
s )ds
+G(τS ∧ ρ,X
t0,x0,α(ρ
ǫ)
τS∧ρǫ ) · 1{τS∧ρǫ<t0+h} − V
−(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,α(ρ
ǫ)
t0+h
) · 1{t0+h=ρǫ}
]
−2
ch2
a4
− ǫh
≥ E
[
δE[1(ρǫ<t0+h)] +
∫ (t0+h)∧τS
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,u0s )ds+G(τS ∧ ρ
ǫ, X
t0,x0,u0
τS∧ρ ) · 1{τS∧ρǫ<t0+h}
− V −(t0 + h,X
t0,x0,u0
t0+h
) · 1{t0+h=ρǫ}
]
− 2
ch2
a4
− 2ǫh,
(5.30)
where we have used the fact that h > 0 which implies that δ
(
h + E[1{(ρǫ<t0+h)}]
)
>
δE[1{(ρǫ<t0+h)}].
Hence, combining (5.30) with (5.27) and since:
(5.31) 4ǫh ≥ δh− 2
ch2
a4
,
for h small enough h < 1, we therefore find that:
(5.32)
1
2
δ −
(
2ǫ+
ch
a4
)
≤ 0,
which is a contradiction since both ǫ and h can be made arbitrarily small — hence we
deduce the thesis.
Crucially, Lemma 5.4 establishes the viscosity solution property of the game which, in
conjunction with the DPP (Theorem 5.3) is derived from first principles. We have there-
fore succeeded in characterising the value of the game in terms of a viscosity solution
Theorem 5.5. If the value of the game V exists, then V is a viscosity solution to the
HJBI equation (3.1).
Proof. Let us firstly recall that by (5.16) and selecting h s.th. h < τS − t0 we have
the following inequality:
ψ(t0, x0)
≥ E
[∫ ρ∧(t0+h)
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,uǫs )ds+G(ρ ∧ τS , X
t0,x0,uǫ
ρ ) · 1{ρ∧τS≤t0+h}
+ψ(t0 + h,X
t0,x0
t0+h
) · 1{t0+h<ρ∧τS}
]
−2ǫh.
(5.33)
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Moreover, since V + − ψ attains a local minimum at (t, x), we can deduce the existence
of a constant δ > 0 s.th. for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S:
(5.34) V +(t, x)− ψ(t, x) ≥ 0 for |(t, x) − (t0, x0)| ≤ δ.
Additionally, by Lemma A.1.3, we can deduce the existence of a constant c > 0 s.th.
∀t ∈ [t0, T [ we have that:
(5.35) E|Xt0,x0t − x0| ≤ c|t− t0|
1
2 .
We can therefore deduce the existence of a sequence tn ↓ t0 for which X
t0,x0
tn → x0 as
n→∞. Let us now define the closed balls {Bn}n≥1 by the following:
Bn := {|X
t0,x0
tm − x0| ≤ δ ∀m ≥ n},
Bn ↓ B ≡ ∪n≥1Bn.
Further, let us now introduce the sequence of stopping times:
(5.36) τm =
∞∑
n=1
tn+m · 1{Bn\B(n−1)} ∧ ρ− .
Hence, by (5.16) we have that:
(5.37) ψ(t0, x0) ≥ E
[ ∫ tm
t0
f(s,Xt0,x0,uǫs )ds+ ψ(tm, X
t0,x0
tm )
]
− 2ǫ(tm − t0).
After applying Ito¯’s formula for ca`dla`g semi-martingale processes to (5.37), we find that:
(5.38) 0 ≥ E
[∫ tm
t0
∂ψ
∂t
(s,Xt0,x0,uǫs )+Lψ(s,X
t0,x0,uǫ
s )+f(s,X
t0,x0,uǫ
s ))ds
]
−2ǫ(tm−t0).
Then, after dividing both sides of (5.38) by (tm − t0) and taking the limit m → ∞, we
deduce that:
(5.39) 0 ≥
∂ψ
∂t
(t, x) + Lψ(t, x) + f(t, x), ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S,
which proves the subsolution property. We can prove the supersolution property analo-
gously by firstly using (5.28) and applying similar steps after which the thesis is proved.
The following result establishes the equality of the two value functions V − and V +;
we defer the proof of the following result to the appendix:
Theorem 5.6 (Comparison Principle). Let V − : [0, T ] × S → R be a continuous
bounded viscosity subsolution to (3.1) and let V + : [0, T ] × S → R be a continuous
bounded viscosity supersolution to (3.1). Also suppose that for all t ∈ [0, T ] we have that
V −(·, Xt,·T ) ≤ V
+(·, Xt,·T ) then we have that:
(5.40) V −(t, x) ≤ V +(t, x), ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S.
Corollary 5.7 (The Game Admits a Value).
To prove Theorem 4.1 it remains only to reverse the inequality (4.4) therefore proving that
V −(·, Xt,·T ) ≤ V
+(·, Xt,·T ) — a result that follows directly from the comparison principle
for the game. Indeed, Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 5.7 then follow as direct consequences to
the viscosity solutions results of Lemma 5.4 in conjunction with the comparison principle.
28 DAVID MGUNI
6. Appendix.
Lemma A.1. Let µˆ ∈ [0, T ] be some ǫ−optimal strategy against V (t, x) for any (t, x) ∈
[0, T ]× S then there exists some η > 0 s.th. the strategy µˆ remains 2ǫ−optimal against
V (t, yj) for any yj ∈ B(x, η).
Proof of Lemma A.1. We do the proof for the function V − with the proof for V +
being analogous. Denote by ρ′ ≡ µˆ(u) where ρ′ ∈ [0, T ]. Since the strategy µˆ is ǫ−optimal
against V −(t, x) we have that for some ǫ > 0:
(6.1) V −(t, x) ≤ inf
u∈U
J (u,ρ
′)(t, x) + ǫ.
Now by Proposition 4.4 we can deduce the existence of some constants c1, c2 > 0 s.th.
for any yj ∈ B(x, η), u ∈ U , ρ ∈ T :
(6.2)
∣∣∣J (u,ρ)(t, yj)− J (u,ρ)(t, x)∣∣∣ ≤ c1 ∣∣x− yj∣∣ ,
hence,
inf
u∈U
J (u,ρ
′)(t, yj) ≥ inf
u∈U
J (u,ρ
′)(t, x)− c1
∣∣x− yj∣∣
≥ V −(t, x) − c1
∣∣x− yj∣∣− ǫ
≥ V −(t, yj)− (c1 + c2)
∣∣x− yj∣∣− ǫ
≥ V −(t, yj)− 2ǫ,
where the last line follows provided that |x − yj| ≤ η := ǫ(c1 + c2)
−1, from which we
deduce the thesis after applying supu∈U to both sides and since ǫ is arbitrary.
The following results relate the dependence of Xt,x,· in the initial point (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×S.
Lemma A.2. For all (t, x′), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S and for any s ∈ [0, T ], we can deduce the
existence of a constant c > 0 s.th.:
(6.3) E
∣∣∣Xt,x,·s −Xt,x′,·s ∣∣∣ ≤ c |x′ − x| .
Proof of Lemma A.2. Using Ito¯’s lemma and Ito¯ isometry, we readily observe that
for all (t, x), (t, x′) ∈ [0, T ]× S:
E
∣∣∣Xt,x,·s −Xt,x′,·s ∣∣∣2
≤ |x− x′|2 + E
[
2
∫ s
0
〈
Xt
′,x,·
r −X
t,x,·
r , µ(r,X
t′,x,·
r )− µ(r,X
t,x,·
r )
〉
dr
+2
∫ s
0
〈Xt,x,·r −X
t,x′,·
r , σ(X
t,x,·
r )− σ(r,X
t,x′,·
r )〉dWr
+
∣∣∣σ(r,Xt,x,·r )− σ(r,Xt,x′,·r )dWr∣∣∣2
]
≤ |x− x′|2 + 2E
[∫ s
0
〈
Xt,x,·r −X
t,x′,·
r , µ(r,X
t,x,·
r )− µ(r,X
t,x′,·
r )
〉
dr
]
+ E
[∫ s
0
∣∣∣σ(r,Xt,x,·r )− σ(r,Xt,x′,·r )∣∣∣2 dr
]
,
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where we have used the standard properties of Brownian motion and the boundedness of
σ to eliminate the linear stochastic integral term.
By assumption A.1.1. (Lipschitzianity of σ and µ) we now observe that:
E
∣∣∣Xt,x,·s −Xt,x′,·s ∣∣∣2
≤ |x− x′|2 + E
[
2
∫ s
0
〈
Xt,x,·r −X
t,x′,·
r , µ(r,X
t,x,·
r )− µ(r,X
t,x′,·
r )
〉
dr
+
∣∣∣σ(r,Xt,x,·r )− σ(r,Xt,x′,·r )∣∣∣2 dr
]
≤ |x− x′|2 + (Lip(σ) + Lip(µ))
∫ s
0
E
[∣∣∣Xt,x,·r −Xt,x′,·r ∣∣∣2
]
dr ≤ C′ |x− x′|
2
,
where C′ := 1 + T ‖µ∞‖[Lip(σ) + Lip(µ)] and where the last line follows from Gronwall’s
lemma, after which we can readily deduce the result.
In a similar way to Lemma A.2., we can deduce the following estimates:
Lemma A.3.
E
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
∣∣Xt,x,·s ∣∣p
]
≤ c (1 + |x|p) .
E
[
sup
s∈[t,h]
∣∣Xt,x,·s − x∣∣p
]
≤ chp/2 (1 + |x|p)
E
[
sup
s∈[t,t′]
∣∣∣Xt′,x′,·s −Xt,x,·s ∣∣∣p
]
≤ c |x′ − x|
p
+ |t′ − t|
p/2
(1 + |x|p)|,
Proof. Denote by x := Xt,xt and x
′ := Xt,x
′
t , using Ito¯’s lemma we readily observe
that for all (t, x), (t, x′) ∈ [0, T ]× S there exists some constants c′, c > 0 s.th.
E
∣∣Xt,x,·s ∣∣2 ≤ |x|2 + E
[∫ s
t
∣∣µ(r,Xt,x,·r )∣∣2 dr
]
+ E
[∫ s
t
|σ(r,Xt,x,·r )|
2dr
]
≤ |x|
2
+ cE
[∫ s
t
|Xt,x,·r |
2dr
]
≤ |x|2 + cE
[∫ s
t
(|Xt,x,·r |
2 + E[|Xt,x,·r −X
t,x,·
t |
2])dr
]
≤ c(1 + |x|2) + c′E
[∫ s
t
(1 + sup
r∈[0,T ]
E[|Xt,x,·r |
2)dr
]
,(6.4)
by assumptions A.2., A.1.1. and Fubini’s theorem (and the smoothing theorem). Hence,
after applying Gronwall’s lemma to (6.4), we immediately deduce the existence of some
real-valued constant c > 0 s.th:
(6.5) E[|Xt,x,·s |
2] ≤ c(1 + |x|2).
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The required result is thereafter easily deduced.
The proofs of (ii) and (iii) proceed in a very much a similar way to the proof of
Lemma A.2. and are omitted. For (iii), we refer the reader to [Theorem 2.4, [31]] for the
complete details.
The proof of the comparison principle is an adaptation of the standard comparison
theorem result, indeed, we prove Theorem 5.5 by making the necessary adjustments to
existing comparison theorem results as given in for example, [10].
To prove Theorem 5.5, we first require the following definition and result:
Definition 6.1. Let ψ ∈ C([0, T ];Rp) be a lower semicontinuous function, then the
parabolic subjet of ψ at the point (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × S which we denote by J (2,−)ψ(t, x) is
the set of triples (M, r, q) ∈ S(p)× R× S s.th.
(6.6) ψ(s, y) ≥ ψ(s, x)+ r(s− t)+ 〈q, y−x〉+
1
2
〈M(y−x), y−x〉+O(|s− t|+ |y−x|2))
as s → t or as s ↓ t when t = 0 and y → x. We can analogously define the parabolic
superjet of ψ at the point (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × S which we denote by J (2,+)ψ(t, x) by the
following:
(6.7) J (2,+)ψ(t, x) ≡ −J (2,−)(−ψ)(t, x).
Let us also introduce the following notation the convenience of which is immediate: sup-
pose Λ : S(p)× Rp × C([0, T ];Rp)× [0, T ]× Rp → R then we define Λ by:
(6.8) Λ(M, r, ψ,m, q) := m−
p∑
i=1
µi(m, q)ri +
1
2
p∑
i,j=1
(σ · σT )ij(q)Mij
+
l∑
j=1
∫
Rp
ψ(m, q + γ(j))(m, q, zj))− ψ(m, q)− r · γ
(j))(m, q, zj)νj(dzj) + f(m, q).
We note that using Definition 6.1 we can obtain the following result — the proof of which
is standard and therefore omitted:
Lemma 6.2. Let ψ ∈ C([0, T ];Rp) be a lower (resp., upper) semicontinuous func-
tion, then ψ is a viscosity supersolution (resp., subsolution) to the HJBI equation (3.1)
iff:∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× S and ∀(M,m, r) ∈ J¯ (2,−)ψ(t, x) (resp., J¯ (2,+)ψ(t, x)) we have that:
(6.9) max {min [−Λ(M, r, ψ,m, x), V −G] , V −MV } ≥ 0 (resp., ≤ 0),
and,
(6.10) max {V (τS , x)−G(τS , x), V (τS , x)−MV (τS , x)} ≥ 0 (resp., ≤ 0); ∀x ∈ S.
Having stated the above results, we can now prove Theorem 5.5:
Proof of Theorem 5.5. We prove the comparison principle using the standard tech-
nique as introduced in [11] — namely we prove the result by contradiction. Suppose that
the functions V and U are a viscosity subsolution and supersolution (respectively) to the
HJBI equation (3.1), then to prove the theorem we must prove that under assumptions
A.1.1 - A.4 we have that V ≤ U on [0, T ]× S.
CONTROL AND STOPPING INVOLVING IMPULSIVE CONTROL 31
Hence, let us firstly assume that ∀x ∈ S:
(6.11) V (T, x) ≤ U(T, x).
Moreover, let us also assume that:
(6.12) M := sup
[0,T ]×S
(V − U) > 0.
Now by Proposition 4.5 we know that V and U are bounded hence for some ǫ, α, η > 0
s.th. ∀(t, s, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]2 × S2:
(6.13) Mǫ,α,η := max
(t,s,x,y)∈[0,T ]2×S2
V (t, x)−U(s, y)−
(|t − s|2 + |x− y|2)
2ǫ
−
α
2
(|x|2+|y|2)+ηt),
is both a finitely bounded quantity and has some maximum which is achieved by a point
(which depends on (ǫ, α, η )) which we shall denote by (t¯, s¯, x¯, y¯) ∈ [0, T ]2×S2. Now since
there exist values (s, y) ∈ [0, T ]× S s.th. M =M(ǫ,α,η), we have that:
(6.14) 0 < M ≤Mǫ,α,η = V (t¯, x¯)− U(s¯, y¯)−
(|t¯− s¯|2 + |x¯− y¯|2
2ǫ
−
α
2
(|x¯|2 + |y¯|2) + ηt¯).
Hence,
(6.15) lim
ǫ↓0
(|t¯− s¯|2 + |x¯− y¯|2
2ǫ
< V (t¯, x¯)− U(s¯, y¯)−
α
2
(|x¯|2 + |y¯|2) + ηt¯).
Now, since the RHS is composed of finitely bounded terms and the LHS is non-
negative, we readily conclude that limǫ↓0
(|t¯−s¯|2+|x¯−y¯|2)
2ǫ = 0 and hence we observe that
|t¯− s¯|2 + |x¯− y¯|2 → 0 as ǫ ↓ 0.
Moreover, if we denote by (sn, yn), (tn, xn) ∈ [0, T ]×S and ǫn > 0 a triple of bounded
sequences s.th. (sn, yn), (tn, xn)→ (t, x) as ǫn → 0 we have that:
M ≤ lim
ǫ,α,η↓0
Mǫ,α,η
≤ lim
ǫ,α,η↓0
sup
[0,T ]×S
[V (tn, xn)− U(sn, yn)−
(|t− s|2 + |x− y|2)
2ǫ
−
α
2
(|x|2 + |y|2) + ηt]
= sup
[0,T ]×S
lim
ǫ,α,η↓0
[V (tn, xn)− U(sn, yn)−
(|t− s|2 + |x− y|2)
2ǫ
−
α
2
(|x|2 + |y|2) + ηt]
= sup
[0,T ]×S
[V (t, x) − U(t, x)] =M.
We therefore readily deduce that:
(6.16) lim
(ǫ,α,η↓0)
Mǫ,α,η =M.
We now invoke Ishii’s lemma (e.g. as in [11]) to the sequence {(tn, xn, yn)}n so that we
deduce the existence of a pair of triples (pnV , q
n
V ,Mn) ∈ J¯
(2,+)V (tn, xn) and (p
n
U , q
n
U , Nn) ∈
J¯ (2,−)U(tn, yn) s.th the following statements hold:
pnV − p
n
U = ∂sψn(tn, xn, yn) = 2(tn − t0),(6.17)
qnV = Dxψn(tn, xn, yn),(6.18)
qnU = Dyψn(tn, xn, yn)),(6.19)
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and (
Mn 0
0 −Nn
)
≤ An +
1
2
A2n,
where An := D
2
xyψn(tn, xn, yn). Now we note that by the viscosity subsolution property
of V we have that:
(6.20) V (tn, xn)− p
n
V − 〈µ(tn, xn), q
n
V 〉 −
1
2
tr(σ · σ′(tn, xn)Mn)− f(tn, xn) ≤ 0,
And similarly, by the viscosity supersolution property of U we have that:
(6.21) U(tn, yn)− p
n
V − 〈µ(tn, yn), q
n
V 〉 −
1
2
tr(σ · σ′(tn, yn)Nn)− f(tn, yn) ≥ 0.
Now subtracting (6.21) from (6.20) yields the following:
V (tn, xn)− U(tn, yn)
≤ pnV − p
n
V + 〈µ(tn, xn), q
n
V 〉 − 〈µ(tn, yn), q
n
V 〉+
1
2
tr(σ · σ′(tn, xn)Mn)
−
1
2
tr(σ · σ′(tn, yn)Nn) + f(tn, xn)− f(tn, yn) ≤ 0.
(6.22)
We now use the fact that (sn, yn), (tn, xn) → (t, x) from which we now observe the
following limits as n→∞:
(6.23) lim
n→∞
[pnV − p
n
V ] = limn→∞
[tn − t0] = 0,
and for some c > 0:
(6.24) lim
n→∞
〈µ(tn, xn), q
n
V 〉 − 〈µ(tn, yn), q
n
V 〉 ≤ c limn→∞
|xn − yn| = 0,
using the Lipschitzianity of µ. Lastly we observe, using that:
(6.25)
1
2
lim
n→∞
[tr(σ · σ′(tn, xn)Mn)− tr(σ · σ
′(tn, yn)Nn)] = 0.
Hence, putting (6.23) - (6.25) together with (6.22) yields a contradiction since we observe
that:
(6.26) lim
n→∞
[V (tn, xn)− U(tn, yn)] ≤ 0,
which is a contradiction to (6.12).
7. Conclusion. Using standard assumptions, we proved that stochastic differential
games involving an impulse controller and a stopper with diffusion system dynamics admit
a value. We also proved that the value of the game is a viscosity solution to a HJBI
equation which is represented by a double obstacle quasi-integro-variational inequality.
The game studied investigated in this paper is one in which the payoff structure is
zero-sum; an interesting question which arises naturally is the existence and characteri-
sation of stable equilibria for the non-zero-sum equivalent of the game.
Expectedly, arguments similar to that given in [7] (wherein the Nash equilibrium
payoffs and controls for a stochastic differential game with continuous controls were char-
acterised) can be invoked without laborious adaptation.
CONTROL AND STOPPING INVOLVING IMPULSIVE CONTROL 33
REFERENCES
[1] F. Baghery, S. Haadem, B. Øksendal, and I. Turpin, Optimal stopping and stochastic control
differential games for jump diffusions, Stochastics An International Journal of Probability and
Stochastic Processes, 85 (2013), pp. 85–97.
[2] E. Bayraktar, X. Hu, and V. R. Young, Minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin under
stochastic volatility, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 49 (2011), pp. 194–206.
[3] E. Bayraktar and Y.-J. Huang, On the multidimensional controller-and-stopper games, SIAM
Journal on Control and Optimization, 51 (2013), pp. 1263–1297.
[4] E. Bayraktar and V. R. Young, Proving regularity of the minimal probability of ruin via a game
of stopping and control, Finance and Stochastics, 15 (2011), pp. 785–818.
[5] E. Bayraktar and Y. Zhang,Minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin under ambiguity aversion,
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 53 (2015), pp. 58–90.
[6] A. Bensoussan and J. Lions, Controˆle impulsionnel et ine´quations quasi variationnelles, Paris,
1982.
[7] R. Buckdahn, P. Cardaliaguet, and C. Rainer, Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum
stochastic differential games, SIAM journal on control and optimization, 43 (2004), pp. 624–
642.
[8] P. Cardaliaguet, Introduction to differential games, Lecture Notes, Universite´ de Bretagne Occi-
dentale, (2010).
[9] Y.-S. A. Chen and X. Guo, Impulse control of multidimensional jump diffusions in finite time
horizon, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 51 (2013), pp. 2638–2663.
[10] A. Cosso, Stochastic differential games involving impulse controls and double-obstacle quasi-
variational inequalities, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 51 (2013), pp. 2102–2131.
[11] M. G. Crandall, H. Ishii, and P.-L. Lions, Users guide to viscosity solutions of second order
partial differential equations, Bulletin of the American mathematical society, 27 (1992), pp. 1–
67.
[12] M. G. Crandall and P.-L. Lions, Viscosity solutions of hamilton-jacobi equations, Transactions
of the American Mathematical Society, 277 (1983), pp. 1–42.
[13] M. H. Davis, X. Guo, and G. Wu, Impulse control of multidimensional jump diffusions, SIAM
Journal on Control and Optimization, 48 (2010), pp. 5276–5293.
[14] R. J. Elliott and N. J. Kalton, The existence of value in differential games, vol. 126, American
Mathematical Soc., 1972.
[15] W. H. Fleming and P. E. Souganidis, On the existence of value functions of two-player, zero-sum
stochastic differential games, Indiana University Mathematics Journal, 38 (1989), pp. 293–314.
[16] C. Gru¨n, On dynkin games with incomplete information, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimiza-
tion, 51 (2013), pp. 4039–4065.
[17] N. Ikeda and S. Watanabe, Stochastic differential equations and diffusion processes, vol. 24,
Elsevier, 2014.
[18] R. Jensen, The maximum principle for viscosity solutions of fully nonlinear second order partial
differential equations, Archive for Rational Mechanics and Analysis, 101 (1988), pp. 1–27.
[19] R. Korn, Some applications of impulse control in mathematical finance, Mathematical Methods of
Operations Research, 50 (1999), pp. 493–518.
[20] B. K. Øksendal and A. Sulem, Applied stochastic control of jump diffusions, vol. 498, Springer,
2005.
[21] J. Palczewski and  L. Stettner, Finite horizon optimal stopping of time-discontinuous functionals
with applications to impulse control with delay, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization,
48 (2010), pp. 4874–4909.
[22] P. E. Protter, Stochastic differential equations, in Stochastic integration and differential equa-
tions, Springer, 2005, pp. 249–361.
[23] E. Roxin, Axiomatic approach in differential games, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applica-
tions, 3 (1969), pp. 153–163.
[24] D. W. Stroock and S. S. Varadhan, Multidimensional diffusion processes, Springer, 2007.
[25] P. P. Varaiya, On the existence of solutions to a differential game, SIAM Journal on Control, 5
(1967), pp. 153–162.
[26] V. L. Vath, M. Mnif, and H. Pham, A model of optimal portfolio selection under liquidity risk
and price impact, Finance and Stochastics, 11 (2007), pp. 51–90.
[27] J. Yong, Zero-sum differential games involving impulse controls, Applied Mathematics and Opti-
mization, 29 (1994), pp. 243–261.
34 DAVID MGUNI
[28] F. Zhang, Stochastic differential games involving impulse controls, ESAIM: Control, Optimisation
and Calculus of Variations, 17 (2011), pp. 749–760.
[29] P. Cardaliaguet, and C. Rainer, Stochastic Differential Games with Asymmetric Information,
Applied Mathematics and Optimization, 2009, pp. 1–36.
[30] P. Cardaliaguet, A double obstacle problem arising in differential game theory, Journal of Math-
ematical Analysis and applications, 360 (2009) Elsevier, pp. 95-107.
[31] N.Touzi, Optimal Stochastic Control, Stochastic Target Problems, and Backward SDE, Springer,
2013.
